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BOOK REVIEW
CAN AN OLD DOG LEARN NEW TRICKS? A
NONFOUNDATIONALIST ANALYSIS OF
RICHARD POSNER'S THE PROBLEMATICS OF
MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY
Frank S. Ravitch*
The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory. By Richard Posner. Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1999. 336 Pp. $34.50.
I. INTRODUCNION
In The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory,' Judge Richard Posner
raises several significant issues regarding the nature of law, legal theory, and legal
analysis-that while uncomfortable for many legal scholars-must be considered.
Posner makes three major points in the book. First, moral theory is not useful in
resolving legal disputes. Second, a more empirically grounded approach is
necessary to better understand law and its consequences, and to better resolve
legal disputes. Third, Posner's legal pragmatism is the path to good judicial
decision-making and useful legal scholarship.4
Posner's first two points cannot, and should not, simply be dismissed despite
the controversy they have engendered.5 While he vastly oversimplifies a number
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law; Associate Professor of
Law, Michigan State University, Detroit College of Law (beginning July, 2002). The author would like
to thank Red Schwartz, Robin Malloy, Paul Finkelman, Sam Donnelly, and Elton Fukumoto for their
input, and Amy Benedict for her research assistance.
1. Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory (Belknap Press of Harv. U.
Press 1999).
2. Id. at 1-8.
3. Id. at 164,210-17.
4. Id at ch. 4.
5. The controversy arose after Posner delivered the 1997 Oliver Wendell Holmes lectures, which
are the basis for The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory. See Richard A. Posner, The
Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1637 (1998). Critical responses to the
lectures were published in the same issue of the Harvard Law Review. See e.g. Ronald Dworkin,
Darwin's New Bulldog, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1718 (1998), Charles Fried, Philosophy Matters, 111 Harv. L.
Rev. 1739 (1998); Martha Nussbaum, Still Worthy of Praise, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1776 (1998); Anthony T.
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of issues, the questions he raises are provocative and compelling. In the end,
Posner's third point-that his brand of loosely defined pragmatism is the path to
follow-falls prey to his first point.6
This review will analyze Posner's treatment of moral theory in Part II. It is
likely that Posner is really talking about universalist normative theory (which
includes much moral theory), and his criticism may be best understood as an
attack on foundationalism. Part III will discuss Posner's call for increased
empirical research, and use of existing empirical research, in judging and legal
scholarship. This review will suggest that these are two separate issues. Posner
makes an excellent point when it comes to legal scholarship, but in the context of
judging, empirical research can be both helpful and problematic. Part IV will
discuss Posner's conception of legal pragmatism, and suggest that he barely
defines it. To the extent that he does define it-particularly with regard to
economic arguments-it would seem that he is simply proposing one kind of
moral theory, albeit one that he fails to recognize as moral, in place of those he
dislikes. Posner's solution either falls short because it is foundationalist or
because it is so indescript that it could include almost all legal theory.
II. Is "DARwIN's NEW BULLDOG" ONTO SOMETHING?
Perhaps "Darwin's New Bulldog," the title given to Posner by Ronald
Dworkin,7 one of the main targets of Posner's criticism,8 should be worn with
pride. After all, bulldogs are capable of picking up on things that lie underneath
the surface and digging them out for display or consumption. As will be seen,
Posner's critique of the use of moral theory in legal discourse has something to it.
Perhaps the "bulldog" has found something after all.
Still, Posner's definition of moral theory, redefined as academic moralism, is
almost comically oversimplified.9 He often seems to conflate normative theory or
universalist theory with moral theory, but in the end his critique may have value
beyond what he defines as moral theory. It is really a rejection of absolute
answers based on supposedly universal foundations. It is in a broad sense a
rejection of the "naturalness" of natural rights and natural law concepts.
Moreover, it is a rejection of other foundational approaches to law such as analytic
positivism and critical theory (aspects of critical theory may be considered
foundationalist or antifoundationalist). As will be discussed later, the ill-defined
pragmatism that Posner proposes suffers some of the same frailties as the theories
Kronman, The Value of Moral Philosophy, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1751 (1998); John Noonan, Jr., Posner's
Problematics, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1768 (1998). Posner responded to his critics in, Reply to Critics of The
Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1796 (1998).
6. See infra Part IV; compare Posner, supra n. 1, at ch. 1-2, with id. at ch. 4.
7. This is a reference to Dworkin's labeling Posner "Darwin's New Bulldog" in his response to
Posner's Holmes lectures. See Dworkin, supra n. 5.
8. Posner, supra n. 1, at 5-6, 52-53, 63, 91-98, 110-20, 132-33, 135-36, 150-55, 240-42, 252-55, 267-68
(this list is not exhaustive).
9. See generally Posner, supra n. 1, at ch. 1-2.
[Vol. 37:967
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he attacks.' 0 Yet The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory is valuable because
it confronts the flaws in foundational approaches to doing and studying law
without empirical grounding. Posner is somewhat straightforward in his rejection
of normative foundational theory:
I claim that there are no convincing answers to contested moral questions unless the
questions are reducible to ones of fact.
11
Every move in normative moral argument can be checked by a countermove. The
discourse of moral theory is interminable because it is indeterminate.
12
Posner defines moral theory for purposes of the book by limiting it to
"academic moralism:""13
My particular target is the branch of moral theory I shall call 'academic moralism.'
Academic moralism is applied ethics as formulated by present day university
professors such as Elizabeth Anderson, Ronald Dworkin, John Finnis, Alan
Gewirth, Frances Kamm, Thomas Nagel, Martha Nussbaum, John Rawls, Joseph
Raz, Thomas Scanlon, Roger Scruton, and Judith Jarvis Thomson. . . . The
members of th[is] [group] think that the kind of moral theorizing nowadays
considered rigorous in university circles has an important role to play in improving
the moral judgments and moral behavior of people themselves, their students,
judges, Americans, foreigners.... Some defend a complete moral system, such as
utilitarianism or the ethics of Kant, and others specific applications of moral theory,
for example to the moral and legal debates over abortion, euthanasia, and surrogate
motherhood. All of them want the law to follow the teachings of moral theory,
though not always at a close distance. 4
Posner also argues that moral theorists who have had an impact such as Locke,
Bentham, Cicero, and others, including Catharine MacKinnon, are not "academic
moralists," but really moral entrepreneurs. ' He essentially argues that these
thinkers brought their ideas out into the world at times where those ideas
resonated with evolving sentiments in the relevant societies. 16 One might view
them as gifted salespeople of moral ideas. He also suggests that it is not the
"moral" underpinnings of their theories that made them effective moral
entrepreneurs, but rather their polemical skills, their passion, their appeals to self-
interest, and sometimes the usefulness of their teachings.'7
This seems a rather artificial separation when one considers that some of the
individuals that Posner targets as academic moralists such as Kant and Rawls have
much in common with his so-called moral entrepreneurs. He also seems to
overlook the fact that not all of the moral theorists he identifies rely solely on
10. See infra Part IV.
11. Posner, supra n. 1, at 10 (emphasis in original).
12. Id. at 53.
13. Id. at 5-8.
14. Id. at5.
15. Id. at 42-44, 80-84.
16. Id. at 42-44.
17. Posner, supra n. 1, at 42-44.
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what he would call moral theory in making their "moral" arguments, and he seems
to minimize the aspects of moral theory in moral entrepreneurs' teachings.18
This is not fatal to Posner's argument, however, because his concern about
the value of academic moralism in resolving legal disputes and analyzing legal
decisions can be expanded to include a concern about all foundational approaches
to understanding law. That is, all approaches that claim to have found an
objective basis for understanding law or legal decisions across contexts and
times.' 9 Even if it is not so expanded, Posner's assertion that moral theory is
essentially useless for resolving concrete legal disputes has merit. It is not that this
type of theory cannot be used to make judicial decisions, but rather that it does
not lead to the only or best answer to a disputed legal question.20 Moreover, most
judges are not thinking about moral theory like Dworkin or Rawls when they
make decisions consistent with the views of those theorists.21 Therefore, such
decisions are not made based on moral theory, but rather the application of a
moral principal or even the judge's view of what is moral, and to Posner these are
not the same thing as applying moral theory.22
Posner came under a great deal of criticism after delivering the Holmes
Lectures, which are the basis for The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory.23
Ironically, much of the criticism was aimed at Posner's refutation of moral theory
rather than his failure to adequately explain his pragmatism.2A While it is
understandable that scholars such as Dworkin, Fried, and Nussbaum would
criticize Posner's oversimplified and brash attack on academic moralism, none of
their responses adequately addressed the most salient aspects of Posner's
approach; that universal normative theory is not useful in resolving concrete
disputes or in understanding the phenomenon of law, and that empirical
approaches might provide better insight. The reason for this is that there can be
no answer from moral theory that will convince someone who believes that there
are few, or no, universal moral truths that can be applied to controversial concrete
disputes across times and contexts.25 Posner argues as much:
Academic moralism has no prospect of improving human behavior. Knowing the
moral thing to do furnishes no motive, and creates no motivation, for doing it;
motive and motivation have to come from outside morality. Even if this is wrong,
the analytical tools employed in academic moralism-whether moral casuistry, or
reasoning from the canonical texts of moral philosophy, or careful analysis, or
18. Brian E. Butler, Book Review, Posner's Problem With Moral Philosophy, 7 U. Chi. L. Sch.
Roundtable 325,327-28 (2000).
19. See generally Posner, supra n. 1, at ch. 1-2.
20. Allan C. Hutchinson, It's all in the Game: A Nonfoundationalist Account of Law and
Adjudication (Duke U. Press 2000); Frank S. Ravitch, Baselines: Judicial Interpretation and the Nature
of Law (forthcoming 2003).
21. Posner, supra n. 1, at 114-15. Unlike Posner, however, I would assert that the work of moral
theorists might have influence on materials that the judges do use.
22. Id. at 114-15, 256-59.
23. See supra n. 5.
24. Id.
25. Posner, supra n. 1, at 7, 59-64.
[Vol. 37:967
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reflective equilibrium, or some combination of these tools-are too feeble to
override either narrow self-interest or moral intuitions. And academic moralists
have neither the rhetorical skills nor the factual knowledge that might enable them
to persuade without having good methods of inquiry and analysis. As a result of its
analytical, rhetorical, and factual deficiencies, academic moralism is helpless when
intuitions clash or self-interest opposes, and otiose when they line up ....
What is more, a modem academic career in philosophy is not conducive to moral
innovation or insight. And even if it were, there is so much disagreement among
academic moralists that their readers (who are in any event few outside the
universities) can easily find a persuasive rationalization for whatever their preferred
course of conduct happens to be. Indeed, moral debate entrenches, rather than
bridges, disagreement. Exposure to moral philosophy may lead educated people to
behave less morally than untutored persons by making them more adept at
rationalization.
26
While I would not go quite as far as Posner-I have asserted that the social
belief in "natural" rights might be useful in a given context, even if they are not
objectively natural and are actually contingent on context 7 -I agree with Posner
that universal normative theory of the kind that Dworkin sometimes argues for is
not universal and by itself has little normative impact. It is bound to context. The
only response that would be adequate to rebut Posner's claim is: "Here is a
universal moral theory and the evidence that it is indeed universal and can be used
to resolve concrete disputes." Yet the responses to Posner all rely on supposedly
objective foundations that are not provable. They rely on a presumed baseline
from which they cannot prove the correctness of their asserted foundations. This
does not mean-as Posner suggests-that academic moralism is useless, but it
does suggest that it is not useful in resolving legal disputes.u
What Posner prescribes instead of universal normative theory is Legal
Pragmatism. This is not Pragmatism in the milieu of Peirce, Dewey, or Rorty, but
rather I would assert a form of non-foundationalism. Any claim to objective
foundations, and any reliance on a supposedly objective universal theory, is bound
to obfuscate the real and potentially varied bases for decisions.29 Bases that are
inherently bound to social context, traditions, and the contexts and traditions of
the decisionmaker.30 In other words, there are no absolute right answers that can
be discovered through moral reasoning. What Posner fails to recognize, however,
is that moral theory may nonetheless be a factor that influences those making the
decision, either directly, or more likely, indirectly.31 In this context, moral theory
26. Id. at 7 (emphasis in original).
27. Ravitch, supra n. 20, at ch. 1.
28. See e.g. Daniel A. Farber, Shocking the Conscience: Pragmatism, Moral Reasoning and the
Judiciary, Const. Comment 675,682 (1999).
29. Ravitch, supra n. 20, at ch. 1.
30. Id.
31. For example, prior decisions or legal scholarship relied upon by courts may cite to moral
theorists and, of course, courts might cite directly to a moral theorist's work, or a body of law might
evolve, in part, based on a moral theory. A good example of the latter might be the law of privacy as
reflected in Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and its progeny, although Posner does imply that
2002]
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is not the driving source for good or right answers, but rather one potential facet
of the context of the decision maker.
Non-foundationalism is not synonymous with Postmodemism and it is not
the same as anti-foundationalism. 32 It rejects the notion that there are objective
foundations since there is no objective basis from which to determine what is
"objective. 3 This is because our context and preconceptions affect what we view
as objective. 34 Moreover, non-foundationalism can be viewed as an almost purely
descriptive approach focused on understanding how interpretation happens, and it
does not preclude the possibility that the perception of objective foundations can
be useful for a society (or the possibility that it can be destructive).3 5 Non-
foundationalism is often confused with anti-foundationalism, which suggests that
foundations are problematic and dangerous. Posner distinguishes himself from
critical theorist Duncan Kennedy and postmodernist Stanley Fish,36 and no doubt
he could distinguish himself from most non-foundationalists. However, The
Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory is more cogent and perhaps more
coherent when it is viewed from a non-foundational perspective.
Unfortunately, there is a disjunction between Posner's descriptive analysis
questioning foundations and his prescriptive approach of Posnerian Pragmatism.
An example of this disjunction is provided by Posner's treatment of affirmative
action. Posner makes reference to affirmative action in several places in the
book.37 One would expect Posner to make no judgment about the efficacy of
affirmative action in the absence of adequate empirical data, data that could not
easily be controverted by other data in the field. Yet despite couching his
discussion in seemingly non-foundational terms, he seems to make just such a
judgment.3 "
If there is inadequate empirical support for a decision, Posner argues for
31judicial restraint or at the very least a decision that is cognizant of consequences,
and thus one in which the judge attempts to make "things better" or reach the
"best results." ° Posner argues that one exception might be when the result of
such restraint would lead to outrageous results, as in Justice Holmes' famous
body of law is not really based on moral theory. See Posner, supra n. 1, at 258-59. The cases
themselves do not claim to be relying on such theory. See e.g. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86 (relying
ostensibly on a penumbra of rights emanating from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments).
32. Allan C. Hutchinson, It's All in the Game: A Nonfoundationalist Account of Law and
Adjudication (Duke U. Press 2000); Ravitch, supra n. 20, at ch. 1.
33. Hutchinson, supra n. 32 Ravitch, supra n. 20, at ch. 1.
34. See e.g. id Cf Hans George Gadamer, Truth and Method 265-307 (2d rev. ed., Joel
Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., Continuum 1989).
35. Ravitch, supra n. 20.
36. Posner, supra n. 1, at 265-73, 273-80. I would assert that neither Kennedy or Fish are non-
foundationalists, although each may be an anti-foundationalist in his own way.
37. See e.g. id. at 139-40.
38. Id. at 193, 139-40.
39. This will be discussed in greater depth at Part IV infra.
40. Posner, supra n. 1, at 241-42,249.
[Vol. 37:967
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"puke" test or Justice Frankfurter's "shocks the conscience" approach.41
Moreover, a judge should check his or her moral intuition against the views of a
"broader community of opinion," 42 but Posner does not define this community
beyond a cite to Justice Holmes' famous dissent in Lochner v. New York or how it
would function when one is dealing with the rights of minority groups.
43
Yet Posner seems to assume that "non-remedial" affirmative action is
inherently wrong or bad.44 He seems to assume that the Court's definition of
"remedial" and "discrimination" are correct, yet he cites no empirical basis for
this, and it almost seems he is making a moral judgment based on concepts of
formal equality.45 Posner does not question his apparent baselines regarding what
constitutes a "remedy," and thus he is left making broad statements that sound as
though they are the result of a moral theory or at least a normative theory of
formal equality that would seem to go against Posner's anti-formalist, pragmatic
approach:
There is much less discrimination and nepotism in hiring and promotion than there
used to be, though a partial offset has been the rise of affirmative action in forms
that constitute reverse discrimination (mainly discrimination against white males)
rather than mere correction of past discrimination.'4
Americans today are uncomfortable with racial classifications used to allocate public
benefits and burdens, yet recognize that the disaffection of blacks poses a serious
social problem. Although the problem may actually have been aggravated by
affirmative action, which undermines the claims of all blacks to be recognized as
true equals of whites, its sudden and complete elimination today throughout the
public sector (and private, if the civil rights statutes were reinterpreted as
prohibiting affirmative action) could not be 'sold' to blacks as the elimination of an
unjust preference. It would instead be provocative, exacerbating racial tensions,
which is something that on pragmatic grounds, our society can ill afford. So neither
complete acceptance nor complete rejection of affirmative action would be a
practical course of action, and, fortunately, neither extreme is compelled by clear
constitutional or statutory texts or precedents. When affirmative action imposes
heavy costs on identified whites (as when blacks are given superseniority in firms
that lay off surplus workers in reverse order of seniority), it will probably be
rejected. When it is plainly necessary either as a remedy for unlawful discrimination
or in order to maintain the legitimacy and hence efficacy of the government's
security apparatus (as in the case of affirmative action in police forces and
correctional staffs), it will probably be accepted. In between these extremes,
decisions will turn on the values of the decision-makers- will be, in other words,
inescapably political ....
41. Id at 147-49, 240.
42. Id. at 259.
43. The obvious question that arises is to what broader community should we look when the issue
involves potentially unconstitutional or illegal oppression of an unpopular, or any, minority group.
44. Posner, supra n. 1, at 139-140,193.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 193.
2002]
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To acknowledge the inescapably political character of an important class of judicial
decisions will scandalize many legal thinkers. But no better solution to the issue of
affirmative action is available through moral reasoning, which would bog down in
interminable debates over historical injustices, justice between generations,
entitlements, reasonable expectations, rights, and equality.
47
Given Posner's overall approach in The Problematics of Moral and Legal
Theory, one would not expect him to quickly jump to such conclusions. One
would expect that he would carefully analyze the data that supports affirmative
action policy and that opposed, while also considering the relevant legal doctrines,
texts, and societal norms. He might be right or wrong in his assumptions about
affirmative action, but given the issues he raises in The Problematics of Moral and
Legal Theory one cannot simply take his word for it any more than one can take
Dworkin's word that it is good policy. In many ways Posner seems to mimic the
Rehnquist Court's approach to affirmative action, which is highly problematic
both doctrinally and empirically because of the Court's failure to question its
baseline before jumping into the fray.4 This says nothing about the efficacy or
constitutionality of the policy, but rather reflects a kind of decision-making Posner
rails against.
Is this simply a case of someone not practicing what he preaches? Perhaps to
a limited extent, but it is more a statement about how hard it is to escape the
impact of foundational normative thinking in reaching a position on controversial
issues. In many other places in the book, Posner's discussion of issues remains
true to his approach. If one is to truly avoid importing moral theory, or at least
47. Id. at 139-140 (emphasis added). Note that by using the superseniority example, Posner utilizes
a situation that even many advocates of affirmative action would question. The implications of his
broader statements, however, especially the implication of what he means by remedy for "unlawful
discrimination," suggest that he has presumed a baseline (and rejected other equally plausible
baselines, such as a holistic interpretation of "remedy" and "discrimination" that considers the long
term impact of legal discrimination and concepts of white privilege) on moral or normative grounds
that are neither obvious nor empirically supported. It is most interesting that he suggests that issues of
historical injustices, etc. are to be avoided, since such issues seem directly relevant to the remedial
question. This is precisely where Posner might suggest elsewhere that empirical data would be most
useful in helping the decision maker to reach the "best" decision. In contrast to his empirical
approach, Posner provides no basis to support the position that he is correct (or the contrary position
for that matter).
48. For example, the Court has presumed a baseline of formal equality, suggesting that there is a
level playing field, that we are a color blind society, and that remedying the effects of past societal
discrimination (even if that discrimination was supported by law and government for hundreds of
years) is not appropriate under the Equal Protection Clause, even in locations and industries where
that discrimination historically pervaded. See e.g. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989) (holding City of Richmond affirmative action program violative of the Equal Protection
Clause); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (same for Federal affirmative action
program applying to highway construction). Yet the Court never explains why these presumptions, the
first two of which at least, would seem to go against reality-empirically supported reality, are an
appropriate baseline for decision. Nor does the Court explain why treating groups (or individuals) that
have been historically treated differently the same is any more equality than acknowledging that
hundreds of years of differential treatment can lead to massive differences-differences that could be
remedied consistently with the Equal Protection Clause when law and government had such a large
role in maintaining and exacerbating the differential treatment that helped spawn the differences.
Thus, it is odd that Posner would presume baselines of "discrimination" and proper "remedy" that may
be empirically unsound, and essentially discount others that may be more empirically sound, or at least
more consistent with social reality.
[Vol. 37:967
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foundational normative thinking, into one's decision making, one must be
prepared to face the consequences. This may mean upholding policies with which
one disagrees or overturning policies with which one agrees. Posner's response
seems to be that there is a difference between moral theory and private moral
intuition, and the latter is inescapable. 49 He makes a good point, because as
Gadamer and others have noted it is quite hard to escape one's preconceptions
when interpreting.50 Since a part of our preconceptions may be tied to notions of
what is right or wrong, moral or immoral, it is only natural that these things might
influence a judge's decision without adequate reflection.51
Herein lies the problem for Posner. If empirical data may support a
conclusion different from the judge's moral view, it would seem inappropriate for
the judge to simply make a decision without questioning his or her baselines. If
the data could support both sides in a controversial case, it would seem
inappropriate for the judge to simply impose her will, this would be little different
than a judge using moral theory. If a judge can use her own moral intuition, which
may have been influenced by religious or moral theory, to decide controversial
cases in the absence of empirical data,52 what is wrong with moral theorists trying
to influence judges even if they have had little success?
If Posner is correct about his first two points (rejecting moral theory and
supporting more empirical study of law) the answer would be that it can make for
exceedingly bad law, both as a matter of policy and as a matter of consistency,
because moral theory can provide no correct answer to concrete and finite
controversial issues. Thus, a pronouncement from a court based on moral theory
and nothing more would be inherently suspect since courts bill themselves as
neutral arbiters of legal disputes, not partial advocates of moral positions 3 The
way out is for the judge to get some empirical support for a decision, or to employ
the tools of empirical research, which could include testing his or her baselines
even if the scientific method in all its details is not applied. 4 Society is more likely
to accept decisions made based on empirical approaches and data, and the judge is
more likely to question his or her preconceptions when confronted with empirical
data or when adopting an empirical approach to decision making.55 This may not
49. Posner, supra n. 1, at 51, 60-61.
50. Gadamer, supra n. 34, at 265-307; Jean Grondin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics
(Joel Weinsheimer trans., Yale U. Press 1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory
Interpretation, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 609, 621-27 (1990); Ravitch, supra n. 20.
51. Cf. Gadamer, supra n. 34, at 265-307; Grondin, supra n. 50; Eskridge, supra n. 50, at 621-27;
Ravitch, supra n. 20.
52. Of course, Posner would argue that the judge should be trying to "make things better" or reach
the "best results" under the circumstances, and if his or her moral intuition is inconsistent with these
goals that intuition should not dictate the outcome. Posner, supra n. 1, at 261-62. Also, the judge
should try to check his or her moral concerns "against those of some broader community of opinion."
Id at 259. This may be an oversimplification of the role that preconceptions, including moral
intuitions, play in the interpretive process.
53. Posner does recognize that partiality does exist in many judicial decisions, even without
reference to moral theory.
54. Posner, supra n. 1, at ch. 3-4.
55. Cf. id. at 59-64.
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9
Ravitch: Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001
TULSA LAW REVIEW
render moral theory completely useless in the legal process, but it does suggest
that it can not lead to the type of results courts claim to be striving for. Engaging
us to think about this potentiality is one of the best contributions in The
Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, even if Posner falls prey to his own
criticism in places.56
III. DON'T LET SLEEPING DOGS LIE: THE BENEFITS OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
One of the most important aspects of The Problematics of Moral and Legal
Theory is Posner's assertion that most legal scholarship and much legal decision-
making, lacks empirical support.5 7 He suggests that more empirical research into
the consequences of laws and judicial decisions, as well as into the nature of law
and legal decision making is needed to better ground judicial decisions and
legislative action, and to make legal scholarship more useful to the real world of
law:5
8
The courts capacity to conduct empirical research is limited, perhaps nil. But their
assimilative powers are greater. I would like to see the legal professoriat redirect its
research and teaching efforts toward fuller participation in the enterprise of social
science (broadly conceived, and certainly not limited to quantitative studies) and by
doing so give judges better help in understanding the social problems that get thrust
on the courts.
5 9
Economics, psychology both cognitive and abnormal, evolutionary biology,
statistics, and historiography have all advanced since Holmes wrote. New methods
of apprehending social behavior, such as game theory, have emerged. We know
more about the social world than Holmes could have known. We should be able to
avoid his mistakes. No doubt we shall make our own. Prudence as well as realism
suggests that the entanglement of law with morality, politics, tradition, and rhetoric
may well be permanent and the path to complete professionalization therefore
permanently blocked. But we should be able to go a long way down that path
before reaching the obstruction. We should try, at any rate, which will require more
emphasis in the legal academy than at present on economics, statistics, game theory,
cognitive psychology, political science, sociology, decision theory, and related
disciplines. In trying we shall be joining a great and, on the whole, a beneficent
national movement toward professionalization of all forms of productive work.
60
Posner is correct to lament the relative lack of empirical work within the
legal academy. As he notes, however, there is some empirical work in law schools,
and there is a great deal of empirical work about the law going on in other
disciplines. 6' Admittedly, the amount of research is disproportionately low given
56. Posnerian Pragmatism, the proposed solution to the problems raised in The Problematics of
Moral and Legal Theory, falls prey to Posner's criticisms unless it is left unhelpfully vague. This will be
discussed in greater detail at Part IV infra.
57. Posner, supra n. 1, at 164,210-26.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 164.
60. Id. at 211 (footnote omitted).
61. See e.g. id. at 211-17.
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the role law plays in the United States, but it is growing. The Law & Society
movement, which Posner only references in passing, is a vibrant community of law
professors and social scientists who understand the value of empirical study of the
law. Posner cites many scholars active in the Law & Society movement, such as
Frank Munger, Sally Engel Murray, Kim Scheppele, Richard Abel, Austin Sarat,
William Felstiner, Marc Galanter, and Richard 0. Lempert,62 but he understates
the substantiality of the body of work that they and other empirically inclined
researchers have developed.
If there is a weakness in Posner's approach here, it is that he seems to view
empirical research and the scientific method as an almost magical cure for the ills
of legal scholarship and legal decision making, but this oversimplifies the
indeterminacy of much empirical research in the social sciences and economics.
Debates may rage within a field of research for years over the correctness of the
conclusions drawn from empirical research.63 While these debates may be
incredibly useful for legal scholars who do not need to decide the outcome of a
specific case before them with specific parties and facts, judges must trod carefully
in the world of empirical research. 4
Posner attempts to distance himself from the legal realists, by among other
things, noting the evolution of empirical methodology since the realist era and the
problems with the realists' use of social science.6 Yet when reading The
Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, one cannot help but be reminded of
Jerome Frank's Law And The Modem Mind,6 given the faith Posner has in
empirical methodology-especially economics-for aiding the judge in his or her
task.
I do not mean to imply that Posner has no point here. He is right that law,
especially legal scholarship, would benefit from increased interaction with other
disciplines, especially empirically oriented disciplines. This ties in nicely with his
point that academic moral theory cannot provide concrete or objective solutions
to controversial legal disputes. Yet is empirical research really "the answer" to all,
or many, of the concerns Posner raises? Does Posner oversimplify the nature and
conclusiveness of social science research?
In the context of legal scholarship Posner makes an important point. Too
much current legal scholarship seems to view law in a vacuum, as though it has no
62. I. at 212-16.
63. See, for example, the discussion about religiosity and discrimination in Frank S. Ravitch, School
Prayer and Discrimination: The Civil Rights of Religious Minorities and Dissenters, ch. 4 (Northeastern
U. Press 1999).
64. See e.g. Landon Summers, The Justices and Psychological Research. But Is It Really Science?, 21
Law & Psych. Rev. 93 (1997) (suggesting that the Supreme court misused social science research in Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), even if the Court ultimately made the right legal decision despite the
misuse of the studies); Scott Vaughn Carroll, Student Author, Lee v. Weisman: Amateur Psychology or
an Accurate Representation of Adolescent Developmen4 How Should Courts Evaluate Psychological
Evidence?, 10 J. of Contemp. Health Law & Policy 513 (1993) (same, but implying oversimplification
rather than misuse).
65. Posner, supra n. 1, at 209-11,255.
66. Jerome Frank, Law and The Modem Mind (Brentano's 1930). Posner's faith in methodology is
reminiscent of Jerome Frank's faith in psychology.
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social context or impact. It is not that purely doctrinal scholarship is useless, but
rather that along with prescriptive (moral theory) based scholarship, it so
dominates legal scholarship that the value of good empirical research gets
overlooked, or worse, overshadowed. This is not simply true in regard to the
amount of empirical research being performed in law schools, but also in regard to
the use of empirical research from any discipline by legal academia.67
Still, there is a significant minority of legal scholars who do or use empirical
research, sometimes even in connection with doctrinal research or research
grounded in moral principles. There is a great benefit to an interdisciplinary focus
in legal scholarship. I have personally benefited from the wisdom that other
disciplines have to share,68 but it does take careful research to avoid simply taking
one side in a debate raging in another discipline. The best-case scenario would be
for all sides of a debate in another discipline to point in one direction for the legal
scholar observing, or engaged in, that debate.
69
Unlike Posner, I would not suggest that other forms of legal scholarship, like
moral theory, are essentially useless, but I agree with Posner that interdisciplinary,
and particularly empirical, research can be helpful in learning the context and
consequences of legal decisions and policies, and that context and consequences
matter.
When Posner applies these same principles to judging he runs into some
minor trouble, but this trouble does not undermine his general assertion that
empirical approaches can be useful to judges. Posner acknowledges that in some
cases empirical research will not provide solutions because results within the
relevant disciplines might not be settled enough for judicial consumption: 70
I do not want to seem complacent about pragmatic adjudication. A danger of
inviting the judge to step beyond the boundaries of the orthodox legal materials of
decision is that judges are not trained to analyze and absorb the theories and data of
social science ....
A second and related concern about the use of nonlegal materials to decide cases is
that it may denigrate into 'gut reaction' judging. Cases do not wait upon an
accumulation of a critical mass of social scientific knowledge that will enable the
properly advised judge to arrive at the decision that will have the best results.71
Posner does not adequately address the concern that empirical data may be
72
misused or misunderstood by courts. This has happened in some major cases. In
67. Cf Posner, supra n. 1, at 210-17.
68. See e.g. Ravitch, supra n. 63, at Preface, ch. 4.
69. For an example of this see id at ch. 4. Of course, it is just as likely that a legal scholar doing
interdisciplinary research might find that the debate in the other discipline is not conclusive regarding
the issue he or she is concerned about. Thus, the scholar may wish to do independent empirical
research with a colleague trained to do so, explain the complexities of the debate if he or she utilizes
the existing data, or not use the empirical data until a time when it is more conclusive.
70. Posner points out elsewhere that the nature of empirical research suggests that at some point a
provable, verifiable, and useful answer might result.
71. Posner, supra n. 1, at 255.
72. This has been suggested about Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), a famous First Amendment
Case. See Summers, supra n. 64; Carroll, supra n. 64; Brown v. Bd of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see
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this sense empirical research could risk becoming the result-oriented tool Posner
seems to rail against. It could become like moral theory or the maxims of
statutory construction, a tool that provides a counter argument for every
argument.73  Posner suggests, probably correctly, that with adequate
understanding of the indeterminacy of some empirical research at given times and
places, courts could come to use the empirical research that is most useful to their
endeavor, without turning it into a vice.74
Moreover, Posner points out that judges can act more empirically in the
decision making process even if they can not employ all the rigor of the scientific
method or data that results from the application of that method.75 When empirical
data is unable to provide an adequate answer judges should carefully consider the
impact their preconceptions could have on the specific case or generally,76 and
consider the impact their potential decisions might have on the broader policies of
the relevant law or legal field.Y Posner writes for example:
[W]hen I said the pragmatist 'is drawn to the experimental scientist, whom the
pragmatist urges us to emulate by asking, whenever a disagreement arises: What
practical, palpable, observable difference does it make to us?' I meant only that
judges should avoid becoming entangled in disputes that have no practical
significance, such as whether judges 'make' or 'find' law. This is not advising them
to create rules of law by pure trial and error; that is not how experimental scientists
proceed. To decide cases without a sense of what the purpose of the applicable law
is-and so in the DES cases without asking whether the deterrent and
compensatory objectives of tort law would be served by collective responsibility in
the circumstances of irremediable uncertainty presented by those cases-is
decidedly unpragmatic.
78
Of course, this leaves the question of what judges should do when the purpose of
the law, the relevant empirical data, and various suggestions as to "best" results
could lead to multiple outcomes. Posner does not adequately address this, but his
failure to do so does not undermine the value of his critique of moral theory in
resolving legal disputes, or his suggestion that empirical research can be valuable
to the judge and should be to the legal academic. His failure to adequately
address the issue is the result of his vague definition of Legal Pragmatism.
e.g. Mark G. Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science
Research in the Supreme Court, 42 Law & Contemp. Probs. 57, 70 (1978); Symposium, The Courts,
Social Science, and School Desegregation, 39 Law & Contemp. Probs. (1975). Of course, these cases
demonstrate that the resulting decisions need not be bad ones (many people, myself included, think the
outcomes in these cases were correct even if the reasoning may have misused or oversimplified social
science data).
73. See eg. Posner, supra n. 1, at 53 (in regard to moral theory).
74. See generally id at ch. 3-4.
75. Id at 164,211.
76. Cf. id. at 148-49,182.
77. Id at 254.
78. Id. at 254 (emphasis and brackets in the original).
2002]
13
Ravitch: Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001
TULSA LAW REVIEW
IV. DOG EAT DOG: WHY POSNER'S PRAGMATISM IMPLODES ON ITSELF
What is Legal Pragmatism according to Posner? After reading the book I
still do not have a clear answer beyond vague calls for reaching the "best answer,"
considering consequences, and making things better.79 Posner does say what his
version of legal pragmatism is not. It is not a normative theory that lays claim to
any universal foundation.80 It is not a purely utilitarian theory that seeks
maximum "utility," because it is hard to determine a baseline from which to define
"utility" in the variety of situations that confront a judge or legal scholar.8'
Interestingly, it is not a theory that is totally based on economic "efficiency,"
' '
although Posner backslides in places.8 It is not a doctrinal theory like positivism,
because a total focus on doctrine may artificially ignore both the social context
and consequences of legal decisions. It is not postmodern, because it is not
relativistic enough and it acknowledges that some answers may be better than
others' 4 It is not a form of critical theory, because it does not agree with several
of the central tenets of critical theorists85
By juxtaposing Posner's discussion of moral theorists such as Dworkin and
theorists such as Habermas, it becomes clear that his Legal Pragmatism neither
supports a specific ideology or critique of ideology.86 But as Jeremy Waldron
implies in his review of The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, it is hard to
adequately describe a theory or approach by noting what it is not.87 Few people
would disagree with the assertion that judges should attempt to make "things
better" or that they should try to reach the "best results" under the circumstances,
and few would argue that judges should not be concerned with the consequences
of their decisions, but Posner gives no concrete basis for determining what
"making things better" or making the "best decision" mean in the wide variety of
cases that come before judges. While Posner suggests that judges should be
concerned with the consequences of legal decisions, he gives little guidance as to
which consequences across the wide array of potential consequences and
decisions. Posner acknowledges the difficulty of doing so given the nature and
breadth of judicial decision-making. He does not advocate ad hoc decision-
79. Posner, supra n. 1, at 241-42, 249, ch. 4. Posner does write, "pragmatist[s] always try to do the
best they can for the present and the future, unchecked by any felt duty to secure consistency in
principle with what other[s] . .. have done in the past." Id. at 241. This is one of Posner's more
concrete attempts to define his legal pragmatism, yet. He does not undermine the notion that his
conception of legal pragmatism is vague.
80. Id. at ch. 1, 4.
81. Id. at 112,253.
82. Id. at 211.
83. See id. at 14-15, 30 n. 35, 35, 216-17, 228-39. By "backslide" I mean that Posner presumes the
efficacy, and in some cases the primacy, of economics, without explaining why he has focused on
economics more than other fields or why economic principles should actuate legal decisions. See infra
nn. 95-106 and accompanying text.
84. Posner, supra n. 1, at 265-73.
85. Id- at 273-80.
86. Compare Posner's discussion of Habermas, id. at 98-107, with his discussion of Dworkin, id- at
ch. 1-2.
87. Jeremy Waldron, Ego Bloated Hovel, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 597,600-01 (2000).
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making, but his vaguely defined Legal Pragmatism is not likely to comfort those
concerned about such judicial decision-making.
Posner mentions Dewey, Peirce, and even Rorty, s but his Legal Pragmatism
is not as defined as their philosophical pragmatism, s9 and it must function in the
world of legal decision-making where concrete answers are needed to resolve a
wide variety of disputes. This is not a knock on Pragmatism generally, or Legal
Pragmatism specifically, but rather on Posner's vague concept of Legal
Pragmatism. Of course, one of the consistent criticisms of Pragmatism, generally,
is that it is vague and undefined.90 To the extent Pragmatism is unconnected to
utilitarianism and basic concepts of economic efficiency it may be a very useful
theory if someone could define it. Theorists like Peirce and Rorty have gone
much further in doing so than Posner does.
One of the biggest problems with Posnerian Pragmatism is that it functions
best when viewed as a form of non-foundationalism, an arguably descriptive
approach,91 yet in prescribing the goals of "making things better" and reaching the
"best results," Posner seems to go directly into the prescriptive realm with little
explanation of how he gets from his "is" to his "ought." 92 It seems as though there
is a foundation or variety of foundations lurking in his approach. Significantly,
Posner does not adequately answer the key questions raised by his Legal
Pragmatism. What is "best" or "better" in the context of judicial decision-
making? Who decides what view of "best" or "better" judges should apply? If it
is the judge, how is this functionally different from moral theory?'
Non-foundational theory can leave room for answers to these questions, and
at some level it can include a prescriptive approach, but foundations and
preconceptions would have to be questioned and a better understanding of the
interpretive process would be necessary. Posner does a bit of this, but not enough
to keep his Legal Pragmatism from falling prey to his own critique of foundational
theory. Either his Legal Pragmatism is underdeveloped, in which case it is not
terribly useful, or it is based on some foundation-the universal benefit of
empirical approaches to law or economic efficiency-that could break the ties that
will inevitably arise in many cases. 94 Since we know that empirical research, while
88. Posner, supra n. 1, at 228,264,266,270.
89. See generally id. at ch. 4 (describing Posner's view of Legal Pragmatism).
90. Cf Ronald Dworkin, Pragmatism, Right Answers, and True Banality, in Pragmatism in Law and
Society (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., Westview Press 1991); Michael Rosenfeld, Just
Interpretations: Law Between Ethics and Politics, at ch. 6 (U. of Cal. Press 1998).
91. See Ravitch, supra n. 20 (suggesting that non-foundationalism is most compelling as a
descriptive approach, even though it raises prescriptive possibilities).
92. Posner, supra n. 1, at 241-42, 249. My reference to the "is" and "ought" harkens back to Kant's
discussion of these concepts. See Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason (Paul Guyer & Allen
W. Wood trans., Cambridge U. Press 1998). Of course, Posner would reject Kant's broader moral
theory. See e.g. Posner, supra n. 1, at ch. 1.
93. Responding that it is the moral intuition of those who have earned the right to be judges seems
an inadequate response.
94. The word "ties" in this sentence refers to situations where both parties have equally good cases
and more than one legal result could be equally appropriate under the circumstances. Thus, in
applying economic theory, for example, a judge would be inferring that such theory is a better
actuating principle for legal decisions and "good" consequences, because without accepting this
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immensely useful, will not resolve all controversial cases,95 what more does Posner
offer?
If in the end he relies on economic theory, and particularly on economic
efficiency, Posner is substituting one moral theory for another. After all,
economic efficiency can easily meet many of the criteria that Posner assigns to
moral theory. For example, if one does not accept that economic efficiency is an
appropriate goal in some, or all, cases, use of economic theory will not convince
one to suddenly accept efficiency as the basis for judicial decisions. 96 As has been
noted too often to be overlooked, there are many aspects of law that are not
meant to be efficient, and while it is arguable that there are more and less efficient
ways to effectuate laws that are not themselves based on efficiency, this does not
answer the critic who would not apply efficiency as an actuating principle in these
contexts. Economic efficiency is as much a foundational approach as moral
theory,97 and the fact that it is generally analyzed using some scientific
methodology is irrelevant to the inherently moral (or at least normative) question
of whether efficiency is the basis upon which our legal system or specific laws are
based.
Posner astutely avoids making his pragmatism solely dependent on economic
efficiency. 98 Yet in many places he hints that efficiency, or at least economic
principles, are a major tool for the Pragmatist judge.99 By suggesting they are only
a tool, Posner adeptly deflects some of the criticism that it is a "foundation" for his
theory.1°° Yet, unless it is a tool to be used ad hoc by judges whenever they think
it useful, there must be some explanation for why economic principles are more
relevant than moral theory. The fact that economics is a "strong" empirical field is
irrelevant to the question of whether economic principles such as efficiency should
dictate outcomes in legal decisions. Only after this is accepted is the methodology
of economics relevant.
Posner's other arguable foundation is that empirical study of law is generally
useful both to legal scholars and judges.'01 As noted above, I agree that empirical
study of law, law's social context, and its consequences is exceedingly useful.'02
foundation, a different actuating principle leading to different results and "good" consequences might
be equally acceptable.
95. See supra Parts II and III.
96. This is similar to Posner's critique of moral theory. See Posner, supra n. 1, at ch. 1.
97. Posner seems to assume that efficiency is a proper basis for legal decision-making because it is
more scientific, but the science is only valuable to legal decision-making if economic efficiency is
presumed a correct foundation upon which to make legal decisions or to achieve "good" consequences.
This leads to a circular argument, because until one accepts the foundation of efficiency the empirical
nature of economics is not relevant, but it is that empirical nature that Posner suggests commends the
use of economics in legal decision-making.
98. He is quite specific about this in places. See e.g. Posner, supra n. 1, at 211.
99. Id. at 14-15,30 n. 35, 35,216-17, 228,239,254 (this list is not exhaustive).
100. There are many places in the book where Posner makes an assertion that would tend to deflect
criticism of his approach, but the deflection often seems the goal of the deflecting assertion. As Butler,
supra n. 18, has noted, this is because Posner is making a legal type argument in places and thus using
the tools of the advocate rather than the scholarly tools he uses elsewhere in the book.
101. Posner, supra n. 1, at 164,211-26.
102. See supra Part III.
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Much empirical research is descriptive and might be used by courts in the non-
foundational way suggested by Posner. For example, to help judges understand
whether a statute is effectuating its stated purpose, what the economic or social
consequences of a particular. decision or approach is, and whether particular
remedies are effective in particular contexts. To the extent this becomes
prescriptive-empirical work being used as an actuating principal in legal
decisions-we must first accept that it is an appropriate actuating principal.
Posner seems to be advocating more of a descriptive use of empirical research
through which judges can use empirical research to aid them in understanding the
legal and social phenomena in question when making tough decisions.103 To the
extent he does so, this would seem consistent with his first two points. To the
extent empirical research would be used to dictate outcomes in cases, without
more, one must first accept that this research can be an actuating principal.
What we are left with after considering these points is either a Legal
Pragmatism that is so vague that it is little more than a loosely associated group of
tools or concepts that judges can use when they think it is appropriate to do so, or
an essentially foundational theory that tries to obfuscate its foundational nature
and dress itself up as scientific and objective. The latter type of theory is exactly
what Posner's first two points argue against.' 4 Perhaps, as some have suggested,
Posner's Legal Pragmatism is little more than a vehicle for a supposedly objective
statement of Posner's policy views.05 This would be ironic, because Posner
accuses Dworkin, his favorite target in The Problematics of Moral and Legal
Theory, of doing the same thing.1 6 I would give Posner more credit than this
because his first two points suggest that what he is saying on the whole is far more
important than his occasional backsliding to what seem like his policy preferences
under the guise of pragmatism.17 The failure of his pragmatism to meet his first
two points is a testament to how salient those points are. Thus, despite Posner's
Legal Pragmatism caving in under the weight of his overall analysis, The
Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory is an important work.
V. CONCLUSION
Posner questions the efficacy of moral theory, or as I have suggested
universal normative theory, in legal decision making, and this discussion is a
valuable contribution. There may be an adequate response to Posner's critique of
moral theory, but to be effective, such a response would need to be based on more
than moral theory or a preconceived notion of its value in legal scholarship and
decision-making. When Posner argues for the value of empirical research in the
legal context he champions an important cause, legal scholars and decision makers
alike would benefit from more empirical study of the law, its social context, and its
103. Posner, supra n. 1, at 164,211-17, ch. 3-4 generally.
104. See supra Parts II and III.
105. Cf Jeffrey Rosen, Overcoming Posner, 105 Yale L.J. 581 (1995).
106. Posner, supra n. 1, at 76 n. 141,94, 96-97,267-68.
107. See generally id at ch. 1-2, 4.
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consequences. Unfortunately, Posner does have a tendency to oversimplify
aspects of the issues he takes on. For example, artificially defining academic
moralism and failing to adequately analyze the differing efficacy of empirical
research for legal scholarship and judicial decision making. Yet, The Problematics
of Moral and Legal Theory is an important work in the discourse about the nature
of law and legal foundations. It is probably most useful when understood as
advocating a non-foundational approach-one that recognizes the need for some
determinacy in law while understanding that foundational approaches do not
necessarily achieve determinacy or coherence. Posner's version of Legal
Pragmatism falls prey to his critique of foundational theory in the end, and to the
extent it may rely on economic efficiency it fails to distinguish itself from the
moral theory that Posner criticizes. Still, Judge Posner has written an important
book, and if one can look past some of the oversimplifications and the vagueness
of his pragmatism, a book that should be discussed for a long time to come.
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